INVEST

Every model in a regulated industry will soon have to account for itself. Almost none of them can.

The whole thing, in one screen

The insight
Every interpretability and monitoring tool estimates a model from outside it, and an estimate is an opinion. ORMAS bounds each node’s gradient chain to four operations, so attribution stops being an estimate and becomes a measurement taken during training. If that is right, every regulated training run eventually has to be built this way, and the layer the market is currently funding is the wrong layer.
What exists
383 controlled experiments across four architecture families, 67 archived runs reproducible from seed, 16,316 lines of instrumentation. +70.3 pp recovery from catastrophic structural collapse. One adverse result, disclosed. Manuscript under peer review.
Why now
The obligations arrive on legislated dates, not forecast ones: SR 26-2 already in force, EU AI Act Annex III from 2 December 2027, Annex I from 2 August 2028. An architecture cannot be retrofitted into a model that has already been trained.
The moat
The mechanism publishes on acceptance, so defensibility never rested on secrecy. It rests on what capital cannot compress: regulatory acceptance, calibration history, and an adversarial record.
The ask
$4.5M pre-seed, 24 months, six milestones with acceptance criteria. Team $1.8M · compute $1.6M · data partnerships $550K · assurance $350K · operating $200K.
The risk
No revenue, no customers, zero customer conversations. One person. Every result on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. The whole remaining programme is falsifiable for under 30 GPU-hours, which is the fastest way to find out if we are wrong.

The entire field treats attribution as something you reconstruct after training. It is not. It is something a network either computes about itself, or does not.

Interpretability, monitoring and governance tooling all share one assumption: that you can build a simpler model of a trained network and report what the approximation says. That assumption is why two of those tools disagree on the same input, and why none of their output can be entered as evidence by an institution that is legally obliged to produce some.

ORMAS bounds each node’s local gradient chain to four operations through a shared 4,715-parameter bottleneck. Because the chain is bounded, per-node attribution stops being an estimate and becomes a measurement taken from the backward pass. A model trained this way arrives with the account already made.

If that is right, every regulated training run eventually has to be built this way, and the layer everyone is currently investing in is the wrong layer.

+70.3pp

Recovery from catastrophic structural collapse, where a parameter-matched baseline is permanently dead

383

Controlled experiments across four architecture families, every run reproducible from seed

<30GPU-hrs

To falsify the entire remaining research programme, on a single card

1person

Who built all of it. The second is the most consequential thing this round buys

WHY NOW

The demand event has a date on it.

The usual answer to “why has nobody built this” is that the incentive did not exist. Here it is arriving on a legislated calendar, and an architecture cannot be retrofitted into a model that has already been trained — so it has to exist before the date, not after it.

202620272028202920302031TODAYSR 26-2 supersedes SR 11-7Fed · FDIC · OCCEU AI Act Omnibus in forceEuropean CommissionAnnex III high-risk obligations applyEU AI ActAnnex I obligations applyEU AI ActEuropean Health Data Space, first phaseEHDSEuropean Health Data Space, full scopeEHDS
Dates in law as at September 2026. Filled marks have already taken effect.

Two of these have already happened. An institution that begins the architecture question in 2027 is not late by a quarter — it is late by a training cycle, and a training cycle in a regulated environment is measured in years.

DEFENSIBILITY

The moat is time nobody can buy.

The mechanism is published on acceptance, so defensibility does not rest on secrecy and this page will not pretend it does. It rests on the things capital cannot compress.

Regulatory acceptance is not compressible

A competitor can reimplement a published architecture in weeks. They cannot compress the time it takes a validator, an examiner or a notified body to accept a counterparty and a method. That clock runs at the speed of institutions, and it does not run faster for a better-funded entrant.

Calibration is empirical, not architectural

What is licensed is a calibrated bound and somebody accountable for it. Calibration is accumulated runs, adversarial testing and failure history. A reimplementation arrives with the architecture and none of the record behind it, which is the part an institution is actually buying.

Publishing is the distribution strategy

In fields where the buyer is obliged to show their working, the released implementation becomes the one validators check against. Being the reference is a stronger position than being the secret, and it is only available to whoever publishes first.

The incumbents are structurally committed

Every interpretability and observability vendor is built on the premise that attribution is recovered after training. Adopting this architecture means conceding that premise was wrong. That is not a product decision they can take quickly.

THE NUMBER

$4.5M, and here is the arithmetic behind it.

Priced against the market rather than picked. The published H1 2026 benchmarks are below, and every line of the round is costed underneath them at rates anyone can check.

Broad pre-seed median

$1.2M

All sectors, H1 2026. Range $500K–$2.5M.

Deep tech and AI infrastructure

$2M–$5M

Raised above the median specifically to cover compute and research.

AI seed median

$4.6M

A 1.3x premium on the broader seed market.

This round

$4.5M

Top of the deep tech pre-seed band, costed line by line below.

The pre-seed market in 2026 is a barbell — sub-$250K party rounds at one end, $2.5M+ lead-led rounds at the other. A figure in between is the one position with no natural buyer, and it would also not cover the compute.

USE OF FUNDS

Six line items. Each one buys down a named risk.

Deep tech is funded against de-risking rather than revenue, so this is set out as risks removed rather than categories of spend. Every item carries an acceptance criterion, because a milestone you cannot write acceptance criteria for is an intention. Runway is 24 months.

  1. 01

    Team

    Five people, 24 months, fully loaded

    $1.8MKey-person risk

    A co-founder, two research engineers, a systems engineer to take a research codebase to something an institution can deploy, and an assurance lead who owns the bound. The company is one person. That is not modesty — there is more validated work available right now than one person can execute, and every month of it is being lost.

    Done whenThree people who can independently extend the architecture, and one production implementation with the modification record unified across every code path.

  2. 02

    Compute

    800 NVIDIA SXM accelerators — 100 nodes × 8 — NVLink intra-node, 400G InfiniBand fabric, all-flash NVMe. Reserved, not owned. A bounded 4–6 week campaign.

    $1.6MScale risk

    Every result to date runs on CIFAR because that is what one person could afford. The first question any technical evaluator asks is whether the property holds at scale, and it is answerable with hardware and not answerable without it. The requirement is a genuine training fabric rather than a pile of cards: 100 eight-GPU nodes on NVLink, joined by 400G InfiniBand, with flash on the same fabric — the bottleneck in a bounded-attribution run is interconnect, not FLOPs. It is rented and released. Buying 800 accelerators is roughly $30M of hardware before power, and holding them idle is the most common way a round this size disappears with nothing attached to it.

    Done whenBounded attribution demonstrated at frontier parameter counts, on the same adversarial suite the current architecture was hardened against, with every run reproducible from seed.

  3. 03

    Data partnerships

    Three to five non-exclusive regulated datasets, $50K–$500K each, plus the legal work around them

    $550KDomain risk

    No clinical, biological, financial or defence data has ever touched this system, and one partnership does not fix that — a property demonstrated on a single dataset is a coincidence until it holds across sectors. This funds several in parallel, plus the data use agreements, ethics approvals and custodian assurance work that gate each one. Healthcare AI developers spend an average of $2.4M a year on licensed data; the ask here is deliberately at the non-exclusive end.

    Done whenThree signed dataset partnerships across at least two regulated sectors, and the property demonstrated on data carrying a real obligation.

  4. 04

    Assurance, certification and IP

    Delaware C-corp conversion, SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001, EU Article 27 representation, patent filings

    $350KProcurement and structural risk

    Every one of these is a gate rather than an ornament. The Delaware conversion has to complete before a US institutional round can close into it. SOC 2 is a procurement baseline in 2026 rather than a differentiator. An EU Article 27 representative is a legal requirement for a UK company offering services to EU data subjects. And the programme extending the architecture cannot be published until it is protected. None of this is optional and all of it has a lead time measured in months.

    Done whenDelaware C-corporation incorporated and the round able to close into it, SOC 2 Type II held, EU representation appointed, and priority filings made.

  5. 05

    Calibrating the bound

    The asset a reimplementation does not come with

    Within compute and teamCommercial risk

    What an institution licenses is not the architecture, which is released on publication and free to copy from that day. It is a calibrated bound and a counterparty who will stand behind it in a filing. Calibration is accumulated runs, adversarial testing and failure history — it is bought with the compute and the people above, and it is the single line on this page that compounds.

    Done whenA published calibration methodology and a bound an external validator can independently verify.

  6. 06

    Operating

    24 months of everything else

    $200KRunway risk

    Insurance, tooling, accounting, the San Francisco relocation, and the contingency any honest budget carries. Listed rather than folded into another line, because a use-of-funds with no operating line has simply hidden it somewhere else.

    Done when24 months of runway with the milestones above met inside it.

CAPITAL DISCIPLINE

What this round is deliberately not spent on.

A use-of-funds is only as credible as the things it refuses. These four are the most common ways a round this size disappears with no result attached to it.

Standing GPU capacity

The compute is a bounded campaign with a release date. Idle accelerators are the most common way a deep tech round disappears without a result attached.

Sales headcount

There is nothing to scale yet. The first conversations are had by the person who built the architecture, because at this stage they are technical conversations.

Marketing spend

The buyers are a few hundred institutions worldwide and they are reachable by name. Demand generation is not the constraint; evidence is.

Exclusive data deals

Exclusive refreshed regulated data runs $500K–$5M a year and would consume the round. Non-exclusive datasets prove the same property at a tenth of the price.

THE LADDER

What is already removed, and what this round removes next.

THE RISK REGISTER

Everything a diligence process would find, listed first.

None of this is disclosed reluctantly. An investor who finds these in week three discounts everything else on the page; an investor who reads them here is evaluating the same company with better information.

No revenue, no customers, no pilot.

Zero customer conversations have taken place. Nothing on this site claims otherwise, and any diligence process will confirm it quickly.

One adverse published result.

Under adversarial weight injection the architecture is 1.0 pp worse than a parameter-matched baseline. It is published on the technology page and named in every market where it bears on a decision.

Key-person risk is total.

One person wrote all of it. That is the first thing this round is spent on, and it is the reason the round exists at this size rather than a smaller one.

You are giving the mechanism away.

Deliberately, and on acceptance rather than now — a result nobody can check is worth nothing to a regulator, and the defensibility was never intended to rest on secrecy. What is not published is the programme extending it, which stays unpublished until it is protected.

The evidence base is CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.

Stated on every page where a result appears. The architecture is domain-independent by construction; that is an argument, and this round converts it into a result.

Regulatory timelines can move.

They can, and they have moved before — the Omnibus shifted Annex III to December 2027. They move later, not away. Every reset extends the window rather than closing it.

DILIGENCE

Waiting does not buy you information here.

The rational default on any pre-seed is to wait. More data arrives, the founder becomes better known, and the option costs nothing. That default is usually correct, and on this company it is not, for one specific reason.

The entire remaining research programme can be falsified for under 30 GPU-hours, on a single card, using a specification we hand you.

That is not a claim about how confident we are. It is a statement about how cheap the experiment is. The thing a quarter of waiting would tell you is available this week, for roughly the cost of a business lunch, and it can be run by your own technical partner on your own hardware without us in the room.

Everything else is checkable now, under a short agreement: the mechanism, all 383 seeded runs including the ones that failed, the adversarial suite, and the manuscript in full. The one adverse result is already on the technology page. The data room does not contain a better story than this page does — it contains the same story with the workings attached.

What we will put in front of you

  • The falsification specification, and the runs that would execute it.
  • The full archive of 67 seeded runs, including the four the first architecture failed.
  • The adversarial suite, written before the results, with its pass/fail list intact.
  • The manuscript under review, in full.
  • A demonstration on your own workload, run in your environment.
THE ASK

$4.5M pre-seed, 24 months of runway, six named milestones.

Oxiedo is founder-owned and incorporating as a Delaware C-corporation alongside the move to San Francisco, so the round closes into the structure US institutional investors require rather than one they would ask us to change first. The conversion is the first line of the assurance budget above for exactly that reason. We are open to conversations ahead of a priced round and are looking for a lead rather than a party round — the milestones above need someone still in the room at the next one.

The investor this suits backs technical risk that has already been measured rather than technical risk that is still a hypothesis, and is unbothered by a regulated go-to-market where the timetable is legislated and the sales cycle is long. The window is not closing because we say so. It closes on 2 December 2027, when the first obligations apply, and an architecture cannot be retrofitted into a model that has already been trained.